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Abstract
In this paper we propose a simple, automatic insurance mechanism designed to
cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union, which could be used as starting point
of a more elaborated policy instrument. The mechanism would use as indicator of the
occurrence of a shock the changes in the unemployment rate of the countries belonging
to the union, and would be financed through a fund built from contributions of these
countries as a percentage of their tax receipts. The fund would be distributed among the
countries affected by a negative asymmetric shock according to the proportion in which
every one of them would have been affected by the shock. Our proposal is illustrated by
means of an empirical application to the case of EMU.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Together with allocation (that is, supplying an adequate provision of public
goods), redistribution and stabilization have been usually identified as the main
functions of fiscal policy (see, e.g., Musgrave and Musgrave [1980]). The redistribution
or equalization function is addressed to correct either structural disequilibria or those
provoked by a shock (i.e., any unexpected event having a direct or indirect impact on the
economy), where the concept of redistribution is related to those of interpersonal
comparisons, equity, and economic and social cohesion. In turn, the stabilization
function would be addressed to smooth the business cycle and so counteracting
undesired fluctuations affecting the economy.
However, within the stabilization function, it is possible to distinguish the
stabilization function in itself, from the insurance function of federal fiscal policy
(Eichengreen [1993]). So, whereas the stabilization function would try to compensate
the effects that several regions might suffer following a common (symmetric) shock, the
insurance function would be relevant in the presence of country-specific (asymmetric)
shocks. Hence, the crucial difference between the stabilization and insurance functions
lies in the kind of shock to be offset: symmetric or asymmetric, respectively.
The central budget plays a key role in the redistribution among territories within
a federation (that is, a territory made up of several federal states, each one formed by a
certain number of local governments) (see von Hagen [1993]). Starting from a certain
structure of revenues and expenditures, redistribution translates into an equalization
function, since the existence of progressive taxes and uniformly distributed regional
transfers, means that those regions (which can be extended to more than one state) with
a lower level of income will receive transfers from the rest. But the central budget may
also provide a stabilizing effect in an automatic way, through direct transfers and
progressive taxes. So, in the case of all regions simultaneously experiencing a recession,
tax revenues would decrease, and transfers would increase; this would be the
stabilization function. However, when a region suffers a recession not affecting the
others, net transfers of the central government to that region would increase; this would
be the insurance function.2
On the other hand, in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
started by 11 member countries of the European Union (EU) in January 1st 1999, the
management of fiscal policy becomes an issue of special relevance. The formation of a
monetary union means that both the exchange rate vis-à-vis the other members of the
union, and national monetary policies, disappear as independent policy instruments
available to the authorities of the member countries of the union, which now share a
common monetary policy. However, a common monetary policy cannot be the right
answer faced to the occurrence of an asymmetric shock. As already stressed in
Mundell’s [1961] pioneering contribution to the theory of optimum currency areas, a
common monetary policy cannot be different for different regions; and, if it responds to
any asymmetric shock affecting to a particular region, the common monetary policy will
necessarily hurt the other regions. All this calls for some other policy instrument to cope
with asymmetric shocks. In this sense, the possibility of introducing a centralized fiscal
policy instrument at the EU level, acting as an automatic mechanism to offset the
asymmetric shocks eventually affecting to the countries or regions belonging to EMU,
has been widely discussed in last years.
The analysis of such a mechanism will be the objective of this paper. In section
2, we will discuss the main questions raised in the literature on the degree of insurance
provided by particular insurance mechanisms. In section 3, we will review the available
evidence on the degree of insurance provided by the federal budget in actual fiscal
federations. In section 4, we will offer a specific proposal of an automatic insurance
mechanism designed to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. Finally, the
main conclusions are presented in section 5.3
2. THE INSURANCE FUNCTION OF FISCAL  POLICY:
THEORETICAL ISSUES
The proposal of providing some insurance to the regions experiencing
asymmetric shocks in a monetary union, has a certain tradition within the classical
literature on optimum currency areas (Kenen [1969]), although it has come back to the
foreground with the publication of the paper of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs [1992].
First of all, if we assume as desirable an automatic insurance mechanism against
shocks, the relevant concept of shock should be defined: asymmetric shocks, i.e., those
requiring an optimal answer which is different in every country. In turn, two types of
asymmetric shocks should be distinguished: specific, which affect just one country (i.e.,
asymmetric both in origin and in impact), and common to several countries but having a
different impact on them (i.e., symmetric in origin but asymmetric in impact).
As is well known, joining EMU means the loss of the exchange rate and an
independent monetary policy as instruments available to face any shock that might
appear. However, the high degree of price and wage flexibility, as well as labour
mobility, required to stand as alternative adjustment mechanisms, should not be
expected to work in EMU, at least in the short run. This is particularly important if we
assume that any country or region belonging to EMU can experience asymmetric shocks
at any time, since a common monetary policy is not an appropriate instrument to face
asymmetric shocks. And even a common monetary policy can lead to different effects
on different countries or regions, depending on their initial conditions, and so becoming
a source of asymmetries. Therefore, fiscal policy appears as a potential candidate to
become the most important policy instrument to face asymmetric shocks.
In theory, under a federal fiscal authority most exogenous shocks affecting a
monetary union would be automatically absorbed due to the effect of procyclical taxes
and countercyclical expenditures. However, faced to EMU, the EU budget should not be
expected to play the same role than, for instance, the US federal budget. In fact,
proposing structural reforms of the budget would require several institutional changes,
such as reinforcing the role of the European Parliament, creating either a supranational4
authority on taxes or funds guaranteed by different budget rules, or establishing a joint
decision mechanism for the coordination of fiscal policies.
Incorporating the insurance function to the EU budget would mean to reinforce
fiscal competencies at the EU level, given that the size of its budget is still relatively
small. However, the implementation of a European fiscal policy in this way would face
a difficulty, since there are no federal taxes at the EU level, and shifting some taxes to
the EU is not envisaged. Since the current structure of revenues and expenditures is not
able to provide an automatic stabilization, the need of designing a specific mechanism
has been discussed in the literature. This question, already noticed by Goodhart and
Smith [1993], has been discussed in several studies trying to answer the question of how
a stabilization policy at the European level might be designed and how the insurance
function might be guaranteed. In the rest of this section we will review the main points
raised in this literature, such as the degree of automaticity of the mechanism, the proper
level of government involved, the equilibrium between redistribution and stabilization,
and the origin and destination of the funds.
2. 1. Automaticity vs. discretionality
Italianer and Vanheukelen [1993] defend the existence of an insurance
mechanism at the federal level, although they warn about the limited value of the US
experience. Majocchi and Rey [1993] coincide with these authors in that resorting to
transfers among governments would require a reform of the European fiscal system.
Since this solution seems to be hardly feasible, they insist in that the alternative
mechanism should operate in a discretional way, in order to be able to verify that the
shock was exogenous and so avoiding problems of moral hazard. Italianer and
Vanheukelen solve this question by proposing a limited stabilization mechanism which
could be activated either automatically or discretionally, in the latter case if the
government of the affected country must prove that the shock escapes to its control; this
possibility takes advantage of fiscal autonomy, avoids moral hazard and guarantees the
insurance’s automaticity.5
2. 2. National insurance vs. federal insurance
The basic question is not whether the federal budget is able to provide insurance
(see the empirical evidence reviewed in the next section), but rather if the
implementation of the insurance function should be done at the federal level. According
to Mélitz and Vori [1993], the insurance function could help to overcome the loss of
national independence in the management of macroeconomic policy, and should be
instrumented at the national level. Indeed, they affirm that common shocks with
asymmetric effects would not be a problem in Europe, so that the EU would be close to
be an optimum currency area that would not require an insurance mechanism. However,
the insurance function of fiscal policy at the federal level would be addressed to specific
shocks affecting the domestic economy (Eichengreen [1993]). On the other hand, the
objective of insurance is to cover oneself against a risk, and not necessarily to
compensate the loss of independence regarding fiscal policy.
In a recent paper, Forni and Reichlin [2001] argue that a European-wide
insurance mechanism would be more effective than a national one. The reason is simply
that the former can potentially insurance both nation-specific and region-specific
shocks, unlike the latter, which can only offset regional shocks. Since, according to their
empirical results, national shocks account for a significant part of output fluctuations in
the EMU area, the scope for a fiscal federation as an insurance mechanism would not be
negligible.
2. 3. Redistribution vs. stabilization
Finding the equilibrium between redistribution and stabilization means a
problem of political decision that also affect the features of the stabilization mechanism;
indeed, not all the available studies clarify the basic difference between both functions.
Italianer and Vanheukelen [1993] design a mechanism exclusively intended to
accomplish the stabilization function, whereas von Hagen and Hammond [1998]
propose a series of redistributive or stabilizing mechanisms according to different
properties included in their design, concluding that, the higher the econometric
complexity, the higher the degree of stabilization provided.6
2. 4. Financing and destination of the funds
Both the financing of the mechanism and the destination of the funds are open
questions, since the available studies limit themselves to point to certain general aspects
on the design of the mechanism (what to insure?, whom?, desirable properties,
indicators to use), as well as to simulate how some examples could work. Only
Majocchi and Rey [1993] propose that their discretional mechanism would be financed
in an ad hoc manner by the countries concerned, and that the amounts to be paid would
be conditioned in order to assure its consistency with the Community’s objectives. The
rest of studies do not examine this issue, although they recognize that the degree of
stabilization attained will depend, in part, on how the funds are used.7
3. THE INSURANCE FUNCTION OF FISCAL POLICY:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Several empirical studies have tried to quantify, from the experience of the actual
fiscal federations, the degree of insurance that the federal budget can provide; however,
not all of them make clear the difference between stabilization and redistribution, and
most of them confuse the insurance and the stabilization functions. All these papers start
from the same hypothesis: federal systems provide an insurance against shocks; next,
they take as indicator of the occurrence of a shock the unfavourable evolution of a
certain economic variable, and study the stabilizing properties of fiscal variables. The
insurance effect is quantified by means of two alternative methods: (i) regression
analysis, distinguishing between income before and after taxes; and (ii) simulations
from macroeconomic models, making some assumptions on the properties of the fiscal
system and the degree of economic integration. In the rest of this section we will provide
a brief review of this literature; a more detailed account can be found in Bajo-Rubio and
Díaz-Roldán [2001].
In general, the studies using regression analysis compute the contribution of
fiscal variables (taxes and transfers) on a variable that proxies the current state of the
economy (state income or product). The pioneering contribution here is that of Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs [1992], who regress federal government’s tax revenues and transfers
on the final disposable income of 9 US regions for the period 1970-1988, with the
variables measured in levels. From the estimated elasticities in both regressions, they
obtain that the federal budget would absorb, through taxes and transfers, around 40% of
the initial effect of a shock. However, these results were criticized on the grounds that,
since variables were measured in levels, the authors were not able to distinguish
between the insurance and redistribution functions.
In this way, when the variables in the regression are measured in first
differences, von Hagen [1992] obtains, for the 51 states of the US and the period 1981-
1986, an insurance effect of 10%. In turn, Goodhart and Smith [1993] obtain an effect of
11% when replying von Hagen’s exercise for the US but excluding the major oil-
producer states; these authors also analyze the cases of Canada for the period 1965-8
1988, and the UK for the period 1983-1987, and find an insurance effect between 12 and
17%, and 21%, respectively. Finally, Bayoumi and Masson [1995] use variables in
levels and in first differences (which allows them to quantify the effect of the
redistribution and insurance functions, respectively) for 48 states of the US between
1969 and 1986, and for 10 Canadian provinces between 1965 and 1988, obtaining a
degree of insurance of 30% in the US case and 17% in the Canadian case.
The second group of studies address the issue by means of simulations from
macroeconomic models, rather than regression analysis. Pisani-Ferry, Italianer and
Lescure [1993] try to measure the scope of the automatic stabilization (insurance)
provided by the fiscal system, following the appearance of a shock.  They obtain an
effect of 17% in the US, 37% in France, and between 34 and 42% in Germany,
depending on whether transfers among regions are included; from here, the authors
conclude that EMU member states would not need a specific insurance mechanism.
Goodhart and Smith [1993] also perform a simulation analysis, obtaining an effect of
34% for the case of the UK, and conclude that an adequate fiscal policy coordination
would be enough in order to insurance the different economies against the occurrence of
shocks.
As can be seen, there are strong discrepancies in the results obtained in the
studies quoted above, which are summarized in Table 1. These discrepancies would be
related to two aspects: the components of the stabilizing mechanism, and the magnitude
of its effects.
[Insert Table 1]
Regarding the composition of the mechanism, according to Sala-i-Martin and
Sachs, von Hagen, and Goodhart and Smith, the tax system provides the bulk of the
stabilization; whereas Pisani-Ferry et al. stress the role of social security payments
(neglected by von Hagen) and the unemployment benefit at the federal level, which does
not exist in the US economy. In turn, Bayoumi and Masson go a step beyond and
suggest that the approaches of both Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and von Hagen,9
overestimate the stabilizing effect of the tax system, since transfers would be the
component with a greater role in stabilization.
Turning to the quantitative differences in results, in regression analyses these
could be explained for two reasons: the sample period (the longer the period, better
results) and the variables chosen. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and Bayoumi and Masson,
use per capita income before taxes, whereas von Hagen, and Goodhart and Smith, use
the gross state product, a wider measure of economic activity. Regarding the fiscal
variable, all these studies consider basically taxes and transfers, excluding the
unemployment benefit, which is not managed at the federal level; indeed, von Hagen
also excludes social security, since he argues that it can redistribute income among
regions along time. Maybe for this reason, as well as using a different functional form
than Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, von Hagen’s results were the most pessimistic of all.
As a preliminary conclusion, it could be said that, although federal systems can
certainly provide insurance, the degree of fiscal federalism actually needed can be lower
than previously thought. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs’ results show an upward bias, since
they overlap the redistribution and stabilization functions. This would be confirmed by
von Hagen’s weaker results, even though concluding from here that a monetary union
can work without any insurance seems to be somewhat extreme. By reconsidering the
results of both Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, and von Hagen, Goodhart and Smith suggest
that fiscal federalism can provide a remarkable degree of insurance. However, since this
result would have been obtained thanks to several budget items non transferable to the
EU budget in the medium run, it might be inferred that, faced to EMU, the
implementation of other mechanisms would be more advisable. On the other hand,
Pisani-Ferry et al. show how the degree of stabilization provided by the US federal
budget would be lower than for several European countries such as Germany and
France, due to the fact that in the US there is no unemployment benefit at the federal
level. This would favour keeping relatively independent fiscal policies in the EU,
without being necessary either any budget reform or creating automatic mechanisms to
implement the insurance function.10
4. AN INSURANCE MECHANISM AGAINST ASYMMETRIC
SHOCKS IN EMU
We have reviewed in the previous sections a number of studies that analyze,
from a theoretical point of view, different mechanisms addressed to implement the
insurance function in EMU; as well as the available empirical evidence on such
mechanisms from the experience of the actual fiscal federations. In practice, the degree
of coverage provided is an empirical question that would depend, in principle, on the
characteristics of the mechanism. However, to the technical problems of design and
implementation, we should add the political problem of its general acceptance.
4. 1.   The main characteristics of the mechanism
Aside the legal bases underlying the correct working of the mechanism, the more
relevant questions concerning its design would be the following.
4. 1. 1.Why an automatic mechanism?
Despite the increasing degree of integration among the European countries, the
possibility that any country or region belonging to EMU might experience asymmetric
shocks should not to be neglected. And, given the less than perfect working of market
mechanisms (such as price and wage flexibility, and labour mobility), and the
inadequacy of a common monetary policy to face asymmetric shocks, fiscal policy
emerges as the natural candidate to cope with asymmetric shocks in EMU. Also, given
the limits imposed to the use of fiscal policy by the Pact for Stability and Growth, and
the available empirical evidence on the insurance role played by federal budgets in
actual fiscal federations, an automatic mechanism would seem to be more feasible than
a discretional device.
4. 1. 2.When should it work?
When the indicator of the occurrence of a shock is activated. Before defining
such an indicator, its desirable properties should be stressed: it must be a measure both
reliable and quickly available, and its fluctuations must provide some information on the
cyclical behaviour of real output. In principle, we can choose the negative evolution of a
cyclical indicator (output or employment level, rate of growth of the economy), relative11
to the EU average. As in Italianer and Vanheukelen [1993], we will use the change in
the unemployment rate, under the assumption that changes in that variable correspond
with changes in the opposite sense in the economy’s rate of growth. However, unlike
these authors, we take all countries experiencing an increase in unemployment as
eligible to receive funds from the insurance mechanism, provided that unemployment
decreases in at least one country, irrespective of whether this increase was above or
below EMU’s average. This implies that those countries where unemployment is
increasing but below EMU’s average, are taken as being affected by a negative, not
positive, asymmetric shock; which could be justified since these countries would be
reluctant to be net contributors to the mechanism despite the fact that their
unemployment rates had increased.
On the other hand, the choice of the unemployment rate can be justified on the
grounds that it becomes available relatively easily and with a short time lag, both at the
national and regional level; and is also available (unlike output measures) at a monthly
frequency, more appropriate to reveal the appearance of a shock than, e.g., quarterly or
annual frequencies. It is true, however, that the evolution of the rate of unemployment
also reflects changes in the rate of activity, which is not directly related to the effect of a
shock. Despite this disadvantage, given data availability, the unemployment rate seems
to be the best candidate to become the indicator of the occurrence of a shock
1.
Finally, in order to eliminate any structural component, the unemployment rate
should be measured as the deviation from its long-run trend.
4. 1. 3.How should it work?
Compensating in relative terms to those regions negatively affected by a shock.
Following von Hagen and Hammond [1998], the desirable properties of an insurance
mechanism would be: (i) it must operate with simplicity, both regarding its financing
                                                
1  An anonymous referee suggested to us the use of employment, rather than unemployment, as the
best indicator of the occurrence of a shock. Even though we agree with this opinion, we have not
been able to find homogenous employment data for the EMU countries at a monthly frequency
when performing our empirical example (see below). For this reason, we propose the rate of
unemployment as the best indicator, unless homogenous employment data might become
available in the future.12
and the transfer of funds; (ii) in an automatic way, avoiding bureaucratic intervention to
assure its correct working, and with expenditures having a specific purpose; (iii) it must
not lead to any redistribution in the long run, so that the mechanism must be designed
to face asymmetric shocks; (iv) it must avoid moral hazard, so that observable data
should be used when defining the indicator of the occurrence of a shock, and transfers
should be performed among governments (in order to avoid creating personal
incentives); (v) it must have a wide coverage and assure budget neutrality, so that those
regions not affected by the unfavourable shock must contribute relatively more, and only
the regions affected must receive transfers; finally, (vi) the whole amount collected must
be fully distributed, avoiding deficits or superavits in the mechanism.
4. 1. 4. How to finance it?
This is a fundamental question for the general acceptance of the mechanism,
since the concerned countries will be reluctant to give up any competencies meaning a
loss of political sovereignty or national autonomy. Given that developing a federal
budget does not seem to be viable in the short or medium run, we will propose giving up
a percentage of tax collections. In this way, those countries not suffering the
unfavourable shock will contribute relatively more than those affected (since, when
output decreases, so will do tax receipts).
4. 1. 5.Who should be the beneficiary?
There is a discussion in the literature about whether the beneficiary should be
governments, or rather the individuals. Under the proposed mechanism, the ultimate
beneficiary would be the individuals becoming unemployed every period under analysis
(i.e., every month). That is, each country affected would receive from the federal
authority a proportion over the total amount collected, according to the change in its
unemployment rate, which the government of that country (or, alternatively, other lower
levels of government) should ultimately distribute among those becoming unemployed
during that month. In this way, automaticity would be warranted since revenues would
have the specific purpose of subsidizing unemployment. Indeed, on insuring individuals
and not governments, the problems arising when an asymmetric shock would affect to a
region belonging to more than one country would be minimized (von Hagen [1993]).13
4. 1. 6. Which will be the degree of insurance achieved?
This is an empirical question that would depend basically (i) on the concept of
shock considered and on how its effects were measured; (ii) on the relative change in the
indicator and its relation with the effects of the shock; and (iii) on the amount of the
transfers received, and the way governments distribute them among individuals.
It should be stressed here that the proposed mechanism is designed to address
strictly the insurance function, by transferring every period some income from countries
where unemployment has decreased to those where unemployment has increased,
independently of the initial level of unemployment in both types of countries. In other
words, it is designed to offset an increase in unemployment (provided that
unemployment has simultaneously decreased in at least another country), rather than
high levels of unemployment; that is, the mechanism is not designed to correct
unemployment, which should be addressed by other policy instruments, but to correct
the effects of (asymmetric) shocks. This can lead, as in the example below, to the
apparent paradox that the country with the highest rate of unemployment (Spain) would
be a net contributor, at the same time that the country with the lowest rate of
unemployment (Luxembourg) would be a net recipient.
4. 2.   A proposal of an insurance mechanism for EMU
Now we will present a proposal of a specific and simple insurance mechanism
against asymmetric shocks, designed to be applied to the countries participating in
EMU. As indicator of the occurrence of a shock, we will use the change in the
unemployment rate with respect to the period before:
dui(m) = ui(m) − ui(m−12)
where ui(m) is the unemployment rate of country i (i = 1,...,N; being N the number of
countries participating in EMU) in month m (m = 1,...,12), measured as its deviation
from trend. Since in the numerical application we will use monthly data, the
unemployment rate would be the best choice (despite the problems mentioned above)
for the indicator of the shock, given the unavailability of monthly data for other possible
candidates, such as GDP or employment. On the other hand, our indicator will refer to
the change in the unemployment rate with respect to the same month of the year before,
in order to eliminate the effect of seasonal factors.14
The condition for a country h to receive payments will be:
duh(m) > 0
provided that, in at least one country k:
duk(m) < 0
where subscripts h and k denote the country negatively affected by the asymmetric
shock, and that positively affected, respectively. In words, in month m, country h’s
unemployment rate must have increased compared to the same month of the year before,
and at least one of the other countries must have registered a decrease in its
unemployment rate during the same period.
It is important to stress that, if the unemployment rate would have increased in
all the EMU countries simultaneously, the above condition would not be fulfilled, and
no country would be eligible to receive funds from the mechanism. In other words, the
unfavourable shock would have been symmetric rather than asymmetric, hence requiring
stabilization instead of insurance.
As for the financing of the mechanism, we will assume that each country will
give up a percentage of its tax collections. Since the latter are procyclical, those
countries not suffering the unfavourable shock would contribute proportionally more
than those affected. Denoting α that percentage (which will be assumed to be the same
for all countries) and Ti(m) the total amount collected in country i (i = 1,...,N) in month
m, αTi(m) will be the amount with which country i contributes every month m. In this
way, the total amount of the fund to be distributed every month m will be given by:






Finally, the total fund F(m) will be distributed among the countries concerned
according to the proportion in which every country h (h = 1,...,H) was affected by the
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where  ωh represents the weight of the unemployment rate of country h in the
unemployment rate in the whole EMU area (in the numerical application the weighting
factor will be GDP), being H the number of countries affected by the unfavourable
shock (0<H<N). We will also impose the constraint  1 ) m (
H
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h = β ∑
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, which guarantees
that the fund is fully distributed, so that we will eliminate the possibility of
redistributive actions in the long run.
Therefore, each country h negatively affected by an asymmetric shock would
receive every month m a total amount Bh(m):
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As can be seen in the previous expression, each country h negatively affected by
an asymmetric shock would receive a higher amount the higher was βh(m), which would
occur, on the one hand, the higher was the relative increase in its unemployment rate as
compared to the other countries affected; and, on the other hand, the lower was the
number of countries suffering that unfavourable shock. In other words, the proposed
mechanism “stabilizes more” the more asymmetric was the shock, so that it would
exclusively perform the insurance function.
4. 3. The insurance mechanism in practice: an application to EMU
Next, we will present a simple empirical application of the insurance mechanism
proposed in the previous subsection. To this end, we will use monthly data for the 11
countries participating in EMU from its inception, and the reference year will be 1997
2.
The changes in the unemployment rate in every month of 1997 with respect to
the same month of 1996, for each one of the 11 countries and the whole EMU area, are
shown in Table 2. As can be seen, the only countries satisfying the requirements to
                                                
2  The figures for Greece (which joined EMU in 2000) were not available in our data set of
reference. Notice also that, in this empirical application, we use unemployment rates as they
appear in our data set, given the lack of appropriate time series to compute deviations from trend.16
benefit from the proposed mechanism (i.e., those experiencing an increase in their
unemployment rates, provided that unemployment decreases in at least one country)
would be Germany and Luxembourg, both of them during all the year; France, from
January to July; Italy, from January to July, and from September to November; and
Austria, in January and February, and from April to December.
[Insert Table 2]
The total amount of the fund to be distributed, computed from a percentage α
given up by each country on its tax collections, is shown, for different values of α, in
Table 3. When computing the fund, value added tax (VAT) collections in 1997 have
been used. The choice of VAT might be justified on the grounds that this tax is subject
to some harmonization principles within the EU; in fact, the quantitatively most
important revenue source of the EU budget is given by the transfer of a percentage of
VAT collections in each member state. Notice that, given the lack of homogeneous data
on monthly VAT collections, we have assumed for simplicity that the amount collected
every year is assigned in the same proportion every month
3.
[Insert Table 3]
Next, in Table 4 we show the proportions in which those countries satisfying the
above requirements would receive payments from the insurance mechanism, where all
the β’s in each file add to one. As can be seen, these proportions would be higher,
cæteris paribus, the higher the relative increase in the unemployment rate and the lower
the number of countries concerned (or, in other words, the more asymmetric the shock).
Also, given a same increase in the unemployment rate, those countries of a greater size
would receive a higher share of the total fund; in our case, those countries with a higher
GDP, since this has been the weighting factor used when computing the proportions β.
[Insert Table 4]
                                                
3  The different figures every month appearing in Table 3 are due to exchange rate fluctuations,
since the original figures were given in US dollars.17
Once we know the total amount of the fund and how it will be distributed among
the countries suffering the unfavourable shock, in Table 5 we present the monthly
amounts to be received by each of these countries, for different values of α.
[Insert Table 5]
Finally, we have tried to measure the degree of coverage that the proposed
insurance mechanism would provide. Notice that we do not intend here to offer an exact
measurement of the effects associated with the mechanism, but rather a rough
approximation through a very simple procedure. To this end, we have estimated, with
annual data for the EMU-11 area during the period 1960-1996, the following equation
representative of the so-called “Okun’s Law”:
du(t) = γ − σ g(t)
where du and g denote, respectively, the change in the unemployment rate and the rate
of growth of real GDP, and t denotes a particular year.
From the estimation of the above equation, the rate of growth of any particular
country (omitting country subscripts for simplicity) in the presence of a shock (i.e.,
when du(t)≠0) would be given by:
) t ( du
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and the associated GDP level by:
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where Y denotes GDP and superscript s means ‘shock’. On the other hand, in the
absence of a shock (i.e., when du(t)=0), the estimated rate of growth would be given by:
σ
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and the associated GDP level by:
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where superscript ns means ‘no shock’.
Therefore, the size of any shock on a particular country occurred in year t, could
be proxied by:18
[] ) 1 t ( Y ) t ( g ˆ ) t ( g ˆ ) t ( Y ˆ ) t ( Y ˆ s ns s ns − − = −
which, after replacing the expressions for  ) t ( g ˆ ns  and  ) t ( g ˆ s above, can be written as:
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In this way, the degree of coverage of the insurance for country h in year t, would
be given by the ratio of the sum of the payments received throughout the year to the size
of the shock:
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The estimation of the Okun’s Law equation for the EMU-11 area during the
period 1960-1996, gave the following results (t-statistics in parentheses):
du(t) = 1.712 − 0.296 g(t)
  (6.834)(−7.563)
with R
2 = 0.65, and DW = 1.76; the estimated equation also included a time trend, with
a negative and significant coefficient. In particular, the estimated coefficient for σ,
0.296, proved to be significant at the 1% level.
The results of applying the procedure sketched above appear in Table 6. The
degree of coverage has been computed as the ratio of the total payments received from
the mechanism throughout the year (i.e., the last line in tables 5A through 5E), to the
size of the shock, the latter measured from the estimated coefficient for σ, the average
increase in unemployment rates computed from Table 2, and the previous year’s GDP of
the countries involved.19
[Insert Table 6]
As can be seen, the results in Table 6 lead to values for the degree of coverage of
our insurance mechanism between 7 and 13% of the size of the shock, depending on the
value of α. Notice that the higher degree of coverage enjoyed by France (and, to a lower
extent, Italy) would be related to the shorter (7 months) but relatively strong
unfavourable shock she had experienced; in other words, coverage would be higher the
more asymmetric the shock. In general, the results obtained would be in line with those
found in the empirical literature using regression methods (with the exception of Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs), summarized in Table 1.
To conclude, notice that we have presented above the simplest version of an
insurance mechanism. A possible extension, especially designed to try to avoid moral
hazard problems (see below), would be to introduce a temporal limit to the reception of
funds. For instance, we could assume that, for any country h receiving funds from the
insurance mechanism during a certain number of months, there is a “threshold” so that
this country receives next month just a percentage xh (0<xh<1) of βh; a percentage which
would decrease every month until reaching eventually the value zero. In this way, the
corrected β for country h in month m,  ) m (
c
h β , would be:
) m ( ) m ( x ) m ( ) m ( h h h
c
h β < β = β
and, since the β’s must add up to one, those countries satisfying the requirements to
receive funds from the insurance mechanism but not reaching yet the “threshold”, would
receive a higher β. That is, if the number of “punished” countries is Q (0≤Q<H), the
corrected β for any country j not reaching the “threshold” in month m,  ) m (
c
j β , would
be:
) m (
) m ( 1
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for h = 1,...,Q; j = Q+1,...,H.20
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed an automatic insurance mechanism designed to
cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. The mechanism would use as
indicator of the occurrence of a shock the changes in the unemployment rate of the
countries belonging to the union, and would be financed through a fund built from
contributions of these countries as a percentage of their tax receipts. The fund would be
distributed among the countries affected by a negative asymmetric shock according to
the proportion in which every one of them would have been affected by the shock.
Our proposal was illustrated by means of an empirical application to the case of
EMU. As this example shows, the insurance mechanism proposed would lead to a
higher stabilizing effect the more asymmetric was the shock (i.e., the higher would have
been the relative increase in the unemployment rate and the lower the number of
countries affected). Also, the total amount of the fund would be distributed (which
would eliminate the possibility of redistributive effects in the long run), and all the
participating countries (whether affected or not by the unfavourable shock) would
contribute to the mechanism. Finally, we presented a rough estimation of the degree of
coverage provided by the insurance mechanism, which would be in line with the figures
previously found in the literature for the actual fiscal federations.
Some remarkable features of the insurance mechanism proposed in this paper are
worthwhile to be stressed:
•  First, since countries benefiting from the mechanism would be those
experiencing increases in their unemployment rates when at least one of the
other countries experiences a decrease in its unemployment rate (i.e., in the
case of an asymmetric shock), the insurance function would be properly
addressed. On the other hand, if the unemployment rate would have
increased in all countries simultaneously (i.e., in the case of a symmetric
shock), no country would be eligible to receive funds from the mechanism,
and the adjustment to the shock should be made through the stabilization
function; and the working of the mechanism would be independent of the
initial level of unemployment, which should be rather addressed by the21
equalization or redistribution function. In this way, no confusion with either
the redistribution or the stabilization function of fiscal policy would appear,
unlike previous studies on the subject.
•  Second, our mechanism would be addressed to face asymmetric shocks. But
this does not mean we are assuming that asymmetric shocks would
necessarily prevail in EMU. In fact, this is an entirely empirical issue on
which there is not concluding evidence in the literature, and even some
authors have noticed that the greater integration associated with EMU would
reinforce the symmetry of shocks affecting member countries (Frankel and
Rose [1997]). Recent empirical work by Forni and Reichlin [2001] shows,
however, that, although European-wide shocks would explain the bulk of
output variance in EMU countries during the period 1980-1993 (around
50%), the role of both national and regional shocks would not be negligible,
since they would explain the other 50%. In addition, a new source of
asymmetric shocks is likely to appear in EMU, such as the asymmetric
effects of the common monetary policy. Hence, asymmetric shocks are likely
to appear in any circumstance, and an automatic insurance mechanism might
be a helpful tool, specially following the disappearance of national monetary
policy and the exchange rate as policy instruments available to the EMU
countries’ authorities.
•  Third, it is obvious that the kind of mechanism proposed in this paper raises
the problem of moral hazard, although a way to mitigate this issue has been
sketched above, by introducing a temporal limit to the reception of funds.
However, the need for an insurance mechanism against shocks has been widely
discussed given the potential lack of suitable policy instruments against shocks
following the formation of EMU, together with the limitations to the use of
national fiscal policies imposed in the Pact for Stability and Growth. Is it really
moral hazard more important here than for any other economic policy
instrument?22
Notice, first, that the main objective of the Pact for Stability and Growth is to
prevent the risks of default and bailout in EMU, due to the potential
indiscipline of national fiscal policies (Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1998]).
This would imply that the provisions of the Pact would be a first control on the
governments fiscal stance, which would work in order to relax moral hazard
issues. On the other hand, from a theoretical point of view, Persson and
Tabellini [1996] show that centralization of functions and power from the local
to the federal level can be welfare improving under appropriate institutions,
because it can offset the distortions in local government decisions created by
moral hazard. And finally, from a more practical perspective, since the degree
of coverage provided by the insurance mechanism should be designed to be
relatively modest, this should contribute to additionally minimize moral
hazard issues; in other words, the insurance mechanism should be designed
as a help to those countries experiencing asymmetric shocks, rather than as a
fully offsetting device. Hence, the previous arguments should contribute, in
our view, to mitigate to a great extent the problem of moral hazard associated
to an EMU-wide automatic insurance mechanism against asymmetric shocks.
•  Finally, it should be noticed that, even though recognizing the usefulness of the
insurance function, some authors (e.g., Mélitz and Vori [1993]) have proposed
that this should be performed at the national states’ level, rather than to the
EMU-wide level. However, as argued by Forni and Reichlin [2001], given the
non-negligible extent of national shocks affecting the EMU area (i.e., shocks
that would be symmetric from a member country point of view, but
asymmetric from EMU’s perspective), a European-wide insurance
mechanism would be more advisable than a national one. This result would
mean an important argument to support an insurance mechanism performed
at the EMU-wide level.
Summarizing, the mechanism proposed in this paper is intended to be a quite
simple device, providing a significant coverage to those countries experiencing
unfavourable asymmetric shocks in a monetary union, which could be used as starting
point of a more elaborated policy instrument. On the other hand, we should recall that23
the practical implementation of a mechanism of this kind is subject to the political
problem of its general acceptance. In this sense, we find quite useful here Goodhart’s
argument that, once EMU is under way, “politicians and commentators will, rightly or
wrongly, blame the severity of cyclical downturns on monetary union” (Goodhart
[1995], p. 470). In this way, the availability of an EMU-level based automatic insurance
mechanism could help to sustain political support for EMU in temporarily
disadvantaged countries.
To conclude, notice that, in order to guarantee a better performance for an
insurance mechanism such as the one proposed in this paper, it would be desirable to have
better and homogeneous data on the different variables playing a role in the mechanism,
for all the EMU countries. First, regarding the indicator of the occurrence of the shock,
it would be convenient to have available a higher degree of harmonization in the
definition of unemployment rates, or, alternatively, homogeneous monthly data on
employment. In addition, a higher degree of fiscal harmonization for VAT (or the
alternative tax figure to build the fund from), and the availability of homogeneous
monthly data for tax collections would be also useful. Finally, it could be more
appropriate, provided that data are available, designing the mechanism by looking at the
regional economies level rather than national states’, both for the definition of the shock
and the distribution of the fund.TABLE 1: Stabilization in federal fiscal systems
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Source: Bajo-Rubio and Díaz-Roldán [2001].TABLE 2: Changes in the unemployment rate
(1997 to 1996)
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Belgium -0.8 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Germany 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7  0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0  0.9 0.7 0.7
Spain -1.4 -1.4 -1.6 -1.3 -1.2 -1.3 -1.4 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 -1.2
France 0.4  0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Ireland -1.7 -1.9 -1.8 -2.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.2 -2.1 -2.0
Italy  0.2 0.1  0.2  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0  0.2  0.2 0.1 -0.1
Luxembourg 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5  0.4  0.3 0.1
Netherlands -1.0 -1.1 -1.3 -1.4 -1.2 -1.0 -1.3 -1.5 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9 -1.8
Austria 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
Portugal -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5   -0.4 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6
Finland -0.9 -0.4 -1.2 -0.6   -0.5 -1.8 -3.0 -3.1  -2.0 -2.0 -2.6 -2.4
EMU 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1




α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 42481.3159 424.813159 382.331843 318.609869
February 41315.8334 413.158334 371.842500 309.868750
March 41948.3800 419.483800 377.535420 314.612850
April 40560.6611 405.606611 365.045950 304.204958
May 40947.5970 409.475970 368.528373 307.106977
June 40512.1143 405.121143 364.609029 303.840857
July 38555.8586 385.558586 347.002727 289.168939
August 39156.4003 391.564003 352.407603 293.673003
September 39967.6711 399.676711 359.709040 299.757533
October 41125.6019 411.256019 370.130417 308.442014
November 40409.6267 404.096267 363.686640 303.072200
December 39538.6613 395.386613 355.847952 296.539960
Source: Own elaboration from OECD: Main Economic Indicators.TABLE 4: Proportions for the distribution of payments
βGERMANY βFRANCE βITALY βLUXEMBOURG βAUSTRIA
January 0.62597181 0.25616005 0.08696196 0.00416890 0.02673728
February 0.69789050 0.19991342 0.06786719 0.00650701 0.02782188
March 0.61218356 0.26304351 0.11906503 0.00570790 -
April 0.70167113 0.16749700 0.11372473 0.00545189 0.01165525
May 0.76382126 0.15628539 0.05305622 0.00508696 0.02175018
June 0.77941472 0.13954147 0.04737194 0.00454196 0.02912991
July 0.83719251 0.07494282 0.05088361 0.00569176 0.03128930
August 0.96659339 - - 0.00450618 0.02890043
September 0.88414955 - 0.08598017 0.00343486 0.02643542
October 0.87357150 - 0.09439055 0.00301668 0.02902127
November 0.88515748 - 0.06148442 0.00294752 0.05041058
December 0.95801663 - - 0.00106338 0.04091999
Source: Own elaboration from Table 2, and OECD: National Accounts. Main
Aggregates 1960-1997, vol. 1, 1999.TABLE 5: Monthly amounts to be received by each country, for different values of α α α α
(in million Euro)
Table 5.A: GERMANY
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 265.921063 239.328957 199.440797
February 288.339274 259.505347 216.254456
March 256.801087 231.120979 192.600815
April 284.602450 256.142205 213.451837
May 312.766450 281.489805 234.574837
June 315.757384 284.181646 236.818038
July 322.786761 290.508085 242.090071
August 378.483179 340.634861 283.862384
September 353.373985 318.036586 265.030489
October 359.261537 323.335384 269.446153
November 357.688832 321.919949 268.266624
December 378.786952 340.908257 284.090214
TOTAL 3874.56895 3487.11206 2905.92672
Table 5.B: FRANCE
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 108.820162 97.9381455 81.6151213
February 82.5958962 74.3363066 61.9469221
March 110.342491 99.3082423 82.7568686
April 67.9378903 61.1441013 50.9534178
May 63.9951105 57.5955994 47.9963329
June 56.5311996 50.8780797 42.3983997
July 28.8948474 26.0053626 21.6711355
August - - -
September - - -
October - - -
November - - -
December - - -
TOTAL 519.117597 467.205837 389.338198Table 5.C: ITALY
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 36.9425836 33.2483252 27.7069377
February 28.0398940 25.2359046 21.0299205
March 49.9458513 44.9512662 37.4593885
April 46.1275035 41.5147531 34.5956276
May 21.7252454 19.5527209 16.2939341
June 19.1913753 17.2722378 14.3935315
July 19.6186129 17.6567516 14.7139597
August - - -
September 34.3642714 30.9278443 25.7732035
October 38.8186816 34.9368134 29.1140112
November 24.8456241 22.3610617 18.6342181
December - - -
TOTAL 319.619643 287.657679 239.714732
Table 5.D: LUXEMBOURG
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 1.77100235 1.59390211 1.32825176
February 2.68842692 2.41958423 2.01632019
March 2.39437017 2.15493315 1.79577763
April 2.21132117 1.99018905 1.65849087
May 2.08298700 1.87468830 1.56224025
June 1.84004298 1.65603868 1.38003224
July 2.19450693 1.97505623 1.64588019
August 1.76445677 1.58801109 1.32334257
September 1.37283318 1.23554986 1.02962488
October 1.24062747 1.11656473 0.93047061
November 1.19108234 1.07197410 0.89331175
December 0.42044594 0.37840134 0.31533445
TOTAL 21.1721032 19.0548929 15.8790774Table 5.E: AUSTRIA
α = 1% α = 0.9% α = 0.75%
January 11.3583481 10.2225133 8.51876108
February 11.4948422 10.3453580 8.62113166
March - - -
April 4.72744631 4.25470168 3.54558474
May 8.90617732 8.01555959 6.67963299
June 11.8011412 10.6210270 8.85085587
July 12.0638576 10.8574719 9.04789323
August 11.3163679 10.1847311 8.48727594
September 10.5656215 9.50905939 7.92421616
October 11.9351723 10.7416550 8.95137919
November 20.3707282 18.3336554 15.2780461
December 16.1792150 14.5612935 12.1344113
TOTAL 130.718918 117.647026 98.0391883
Source: Own elaboration from tables 3 and 4.TABLE 6: Annual coverage provided by the insurance mechanism, for different
values of α α α α
(in percentage of the size of the shock)
Germany France Italy Luxembourg Austria
α = 1% 10.21 13.11 11.06 10.15 10.22
α = 0.9%   9.19 11.80   9.95   9.14   9.20
α = 0.75%   7.66   9.83   8.29   7.62   7.67
Source: Own elaboration from tables 2 and 5, and Eurostat: European Economy 6/1998.REFERENCES
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